Regional Integration and the Location of FDI by Eduardo Levy Yeyati et al.
  C CI IF F   




ESCUELA DE NEGOCIOS 















Eduardo Levy Yeyati    
















Miñones 2177, C1428ATG Buenos Aires • Tel: 4784.0080 interno 181 y 4787.9394 •  Web 




Inter-American Development Bank 





















March 11, 2002 










                                                        
˜ Inter-American Development Bank, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella and University of Maryland, 
respectively. The views expressed in this document are the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect those of 
the Inter-American Development Bank. The authors would like to thank Josefina Posadas for her 
invaluable research assistance, and José Luis Machinea, Andrew Powell, Andrés Rodríguez Clare and 
conference participants at the 2001 LACEA Regional Integration Network meetings in Punta del Este for 
helpful comments and suggestions.   2
Regional Integration and the Location of FDI 
 
Over the last couple of decades, we have seen an increase in the number and depth of 
regional integration agreements (RIA) around the world. Indeed, the proliferation of trade 
agreements is quite widespread. The former European Economic Community has evolved 
into a single market (EU) and has recently adopted a common currency, while other non-
EU European countries have formed free trade areas with the EU or are presently 
considering accession. Likewise, countries in Southeast Asia agreed to form the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area. The Americas have been no exception to this trend. A number of 
regional integration agreements have been either created (e.g., Mercosur, NAFTA) or 
strengthened (Comunidad Andina)  in the 1990s. Some countries such as Mexico and 
Chile have been very active in forming bilateral trade agreements with countries both in 
the continent and in other regions. In addition, the Free Trade Area of the Americas, 
currently under negotiation, is supposed to create a free trade area from Alaska to Tierra 
del Fuego by the year 2005. 
 
At the same time, the world has been experiencing a dramatic surge in the flows of 
Foreign Direct Investment, which has increased by a factor of 10 over the last two 
decades. By comparison, trade has expanded only by a factor of 2 during the same period. 
The surge in FDI involves flows toward both developed and developing countries. In 
fact, foreign direct investment has recently become the main source of foreign financing 
for emerging markets. In light of these developments, the role of regional integration 
agreements as a determinant of the location of FDI has become an increasingly relevant 
issue for emerging economies. This is the subject that we explore in this paper.  In 
particular, we will look at the effects of regional integration on the stocks of bilateral FDI 
in the context of a gravity model, using data from the OECD  International Direct 
Investment Statistics.  
 
The potential effect of the FTAA on Latin American countries is a useful starting point to 
motivate the relevance of our work. What effect should we expect from the FTAA in 
terms of the evolution of FDI from the US and Canada to Latin American countries?   3
How will the creation of the FTAA affect FDI from the rest of the world to the region? 
What are the implications of FTAA for a country such as Mexico whose preferential 
access to the US may be diluted? Would the effect be similar across countries, or should 
we expect to see winners and losers? What determines whether a particular country wins 
or loses FDI flows as a result of the FTAA? These are some of the issues that we address 
in the paper. While the prospect of the FTAA is what motivates us to carry out this study, 
our focus is certainly broader, as we look at the effects of regional integration agreements 
in general, without concentrating in particular on the FTAA. 
 
A difficulty in assessing the role of regional integration agreements on FDI is that there 
are many different channels through which RIAs could potentially have an impact on the 
location of FDI. Moreover, not all of them go in the same direction. The impact could 
depend, for example, on the reasons that bring about foreign investment in a particular 
country. For instance, a firm may invest abroad in order to exploit a highly protected 
domestic market, thus serving through sales of a foreign affiliate a market that it could 
serve through trade only at a high cost. Alternatively, it may invest abroad following a 
strategy of international vertical integration, exploiting differences in comparative 
advantage for different stages of production of a given good. As we will see, depending 
on the motive for foreign investment, the formation of trading blocs may have completely 
different implications for the location of FDI. 
 
The impact of RIAs on bilateral FDI will also depend on whether the source country is a 
member of the RIA, or an outsider. For example, NAFTA could potentially affect flows 
of FDI to Mexico from both the US and Germany, although through different channels. 
The impact of RIAs will also depend on other characteristics of the host countries that 
make them relatively more or less attractive than their RIA partners as a potential 
location for foreign investment. 
 
In what follows, we will discuss in detail a number of channels through which RIA could 
affect the location of FDI. For simplicity, we will focus on those channels that we think 
should be the most important ones, leaving aside others that we think should have only   4
second-order effects.
1 In addition to clarifying the main effects at play, this conceptual 
discussion should help lay down a roadmap for the empirical exercises that follow. 
Before doing this, however, it is useful to provide a brief stylized description of two 
different approaches to foreign investment that have been preeminent in the literature: the 
horizontal and vertical models of FDI.
2 
 
Varieties of Multinational Activity: The Vertical and Horizontal Models of FDI 
 
The first models of vertical FDI were proposed by Helpman (1984) and Helpman and 
Krugman (1985). In these models, the prototypical firm has a corporate sector (which 
may produce management services and R&D) and a production facility, and these two 
activities can be separated geographically without incurring f urther costs. As the 
corporate sector is more capital intensive than the production sector, firms localize each 
“stage” of production to take advantage of the differences in factor prices. The model 
ignores trade costs, and the production facility produces for both the domestic market and 
the source country market. An implication of this model is that one would only expect to 
observe this type of (vertical) FDI taking place between countries with sufficiently 
different factor endowments, so as to ensure that factor prices do not equalize.
3 No FDI 
would be observed between countries with similar endowments, an implication that is 
obviously at odds with the international experience. While in its stylized version the 
vertical model incorporates just the firm’s headquarters and a single plant, the concept 
can be extended to encompass all forms of multinational activity involving vertical 
integration across international borders. 
 
While in the vertical model a multinational is a single plant firm with headquarters 
located in a different country, in the horizontal model multinationals are firms with 
multiple production facilities producing a homogeneous good, one of which is located 
                                                        
1 For a more exhaustive discussion of the channels through which RIAs could affect FDI, see Blomstrom 
and Kokko (1997).  
2 This characterization and the discussion below follows Markusen and Maskus (2001). 
3 For this reason, Brainard (1993) characterizes vertical FDI as the factor-proportions approach to FDI.   5
together with the company’s headquarters.
4 Each production facility supplies the 
domestic market. A key assumption in the horizontal model is the presence of economies 
of scale at the level of the firm (associated with the fact that they do not need multiple 
corporate sectors), which is the source of the advantage of multinational firms o ver 
domestic ones. Given that firm-level scale economies exist, multinational activity in the 
horizontal model depends on the interplay between trade costs and plant-level economies 
of scale.
5 In the absence of trade costs, there would be no reason for multinational 
production, since firms could concentrate their production in the home country, taking 
advantage of economies of scale and serving the foreign market through trade. As trade 
costs increase, multinational production arises as long as plant-level economies of scale 
are not too high. In this sense, one can think of horizontal multinational activity as a 
“tariff-jumping” strategy.  
 
As expected, the horizontal model of multinational activity has different empirical 
implications. Contrary to the vertical model, multinational activity in this case will tend 
to arise among countries with similar factor proportions. The reason is that very different 
factor prices will make it too costly to produce in the high cost country. Furthermore, for 
a given level of trade costs, multinational activity will arise across countries of similar 
sizes.
6 Otherwise, a domestic firm in a large country will have an advantage in serving 
the smaller country through trade (since trade costs are incurred on a small trade volume), 
compared to a multinational which has to bear the fixed costs of producing in two 
locations. 
 
The implications of both models discussed above seem to suggest that we should expect 
North-South FDI to be of the vertical variety, while North-North FDI should be largely of 
the horizontal type.
7 This is not as clear-cut as it may seem, however. First, countries in 
                                                        
4 For models of the horizontal variety, see Markusen (1984), and Markusen and Venables (1998), among 
others. 
5 Due to this interplay between scale economies and trade costs, Brainard (1993) has labeled this type of 
model the “proximity-concentration” approach. 
6 By trade costs we mean both trade barriers and other transaction costs associated to trade, such as 
transportation costs. 
7 We concentrate on North-North and North-South FDI. Our database only includes developed countries as 
a source of FDI, which precludes us from analyzing the South-South case.   6
the North tend to have much lower trade barriers, at least in the manufacturing sector. As 
discussed above, trade barriers (both natural and policy-related) are a fundamental 
ingredient of horizontal FDI, so the existence of low trade barriers weakens the case for 
horizontal FDI among developed countries. If barriers to be jumped are small, then there 
is little case for horizontal FDI.  
 
Second, horizontal FDI can arise between North and South countries, even when their 
factor endowments are very different, as long as trade barriers are high enough. The 
automobile industry in Latin American countries during the period of import substitution 
(or even today, within the protected environment of Mercosur) is a perfect example of 
horizontal FDI. Third, even with similar factor proportions, there may be other 
differences in locational advantage across countries in the North, which can explain the 
existence of internationally vertically integrated firms. 
 
In fact, a large portion of FDI among countries in the North may not be placed squarely 
within either of the two categories discussed by Markusen and Maskus (2001), but 
instead belong to a different class, one in which firms have multiple plants, as in the 
horizontal model, but produce different varieties of a final good, rather than a 
homogeneous good.
8 In order to justify multinational activity of this sort, one would have 
to assume firm-level scale economies (otherwise there would only be domestic firms), 
and some locational advantage for the production of different varieties in different 
countries (otherwise, firms would produce different varieties in each country). This 
locational advantage could be related  to differences in preferences across countries, 
coupled with trade or transportation costs. To provide an example, Honda produces its 
Odyssey minivans in North America, a market that seems to love this variety of 
automobiles, and not in Japan. A key difference between this and the horizontal model 
depicted above is that the production of each plant is not just for domestic consumption, 
but rather for both countries. Thus, this type of FDI does not substitute trade, as is the 
case with the homogeneous good horizontal model. 
                                                        
8 Helpman (1985) has modeled multinationals that produce different varieties of a final good in different 
locations. Helpman called this FDI horizontal, a label criticized by Markusen and Maskus (2001).   7
Why Should Regional Integration Agreements Matter for FDI? 
 
Having discussed the main stylized models of multinational activity, we are now ready to 
address the channels through which RIAs can affect FDI. Since the problem is a complex 
one with several relevant dimensions (vertical vs. horizontal FDI, insiders vs. outsiders in 
FTA, etc) it is convenient to choose one of these dimensions as a way to organize the 
discussion. Rather than starting from the vertical/horizontal distinction, we will organize 
the discussion starting from the insider/outsider nature of the source country in the host 
country’s RIA. The reason is that the bilateral character of our data allows us to 
discriminate directly between these two cases. It is not as straightforward to identify the 
motives for investment with any precision, although some characteristics of the source 
and host countries can provide useful hints about the main motivation for FDI flows 
between each country pair. Throughout the discussion, we have t o keep in mind a 
limitation of our FDI database: It only includes FDI from OECD countries to a variety of 
host countries (both OECD and developing). Therefore, we will not be able to look 
specifically at FDI between developing countries. 
 
Effects on FDI from Members of the Same RIA 
 
•  Tariff Jumping Effect: The effects on FDI between member countries will clearly 
depend on the nature of FDI. Horizontal FDI is a substitute for international trade. 
High trade barriers increase the cost of serving these markets through trade, and thus 
increase the incentives to “jump the tariffs” by establishing foreign affiliates to serve 
these markets. To the extent that FDI is of the horizontal, “tariff-jumping” nature, the 
formation of  RIAs that eliminate or reduce trade barriers in a preferential way should 
discourage FDI among members.  
 
•  International Vertical Integration Effect: When FDI is of the vertical variety, the 
implications are completely different. In its purest single-plant form, the firm 
produces the good in the labor-abundant country for both markets. This involves 
exporting back to the source country, so in this case FDI and trade are complements.   8
This also applies to broader definitions of vertical FDI, i.e., when the firm has a 
strategy of international vertical specialization, by which different stages of 
production are located in different countries, taking advantage of differences in factor 
prices. Barriers to trade discourage vertical FDI by increasing the transaction costs 
involved in a vertical integration strategy. Elimination or reduction of trade barriers 
will therefore encourage vertical FDI.
9 In the case of regional integration agreements, 
in which the reduction of trade barriers is preferential, we should expect the impact to 
be even larger, since transaction costs are reduced only for member countries, making 
them relatively more attractive as locations for investment. Similar effects can be 
expected for the case of FDI in which a firm produces different varieties of a single 
good in different countries. 
 
•  Investment Provisions Effect: Countries belonging to an FTA often make efforts to 
further reduce transaction costs by liberalizing capital flows, homogenizing legal 
norms, setting up institutions to handle cross-border disputes, etc. To the extent that 
RIAs include these explicit investment provisions, we should expect them to have a 
positive effect on FDI.  
 
The first two effects discussed above go in opposite directions. The question of the 
effects on FDI of common membership in an FTA, then, is an empirical one. The answer 
should depend on the nature of the FDI involved. As we discussed above, we believe FDI 
among developed countries tends to be neither the pure vertical nor the pure horizontal, 
but instead the type in which multinational corporations produce different varieties in 
different countries. Therefore, we would expect North-North RIAs to increase FDI 
between member countries. In the case of FDI located in developing countries, we would 
expect the type of FDI that locates in the country to depend on the level of trade barriers. 
When trade barriers are high, we expect FDI to be primarily horizontal in nature, in 
which case it would fall as a result of the RIA. When trade barriers are low, we expect 
FDI to be primarily vertical, in which case RIAs will have a positive impact on FDI 
                                                        
9 The effect would be similar if the foreign affiliate produces goods to export to the whole world, but 
imports intermediate inputs from headquarters, or from other foreign affiliates within the area.    9
among member countries. It should be clear that, regardless of the impact on total FDI, a 
regional integration agreement can have the effect of changing the composition of FDI 
from horizontal to vertical.
10  
 
Effects on FDI from Source Countries Outside the RIA 
 
•  Extended Market Effect: The increase in the size of the market can generate new 
investment in activities subject to economies of scale, which might not have been 
profitable before the RIA was formed. This effect is obviously relevant for the case of 
horizontal FDI. Mercosur, for example, may have become a more attractive market, 
making it more worthwhile to “jump” the common external tariff instead of supplying 
each of the individual countries through trade. The reason is exactly the same one we 
discussed above, when we argued that a large country would not engage in this type 
of investment in a small country unless trade barriers are very high, since it is cheaper 
to pay trade costs on a small volume than to pay the fixed cost of establishing a new 
plant. Naturally, the external tariff has to be high enough for this channel to be 
relevant. The formation of the RIA can also facilitate vertical integration within the 
region of production by multinational corporations based outside the region.
11 Thus, 
whatever the motive for FDI, the extended market effect should result in more FDI 
for the RIA as a whole.
12 But within the RIA, there may be winners and losers. We 
turn to this redistributive effect next. 
 
•  Redistributive Effects: While extending the market may bring more FDI to the region, 
new FDI will certainly not be evenly distributed. Moreover, existing FDI stocks in the 
region may be relocated. For instance, before the RIA is launched, a multinational 
                                                        
10 This may be very important for the host countries, since the gains from FDI may be very different 
depending on the type of FDI involved. To use extreme examples, Intel’s production of the Pentium 4 chip 
in Costa Rica can have a very different impact than Ford had by producing the Ford Falcon in Argentina up 
to the late 1980s. 
11 Note that this effect can also be present for the case of FDI from source countries within the same RIA. 
12 This effect may be different for different types of RIAs. In particular, when a country from the South 
forms a RIA with a country from the North, it may become particularly attractive, since it combines some 
“southern” locational advantages (for example, low wages) with access to a developed market. Production 
of some Volkswagen automobiles in Mexico is a case in point. 
   10
corporation might have horizontal FDI in all the countries in a given region. When 
barriers to trade within the region are eliminated, the firm may choose to concentrate 
production in a single plant and supply the rest of the countries through trade. At any 
rate, extending the market may bring about winners and losers, which may generate 
interesting political economy dynamics. 
 
A key question, then, is what determines whether a country is a winner or a loser in this 
game. Even if tariffs are eliminated, as long as other trade costs (such as transportation 
costs) remain, the size of the individual economies may be an important variable in this 
regard, since plant-level economies may dictate that the firm locate its plant in the larger 
market (or the one most centrally located so as to minimize the cost of supplying the 
whole region).
13 The biggest losers could in fact be medium-sized countries, since very 
small countries would have been supplied by trade anyway, unless their trade barriers 
were extremely high.
14  Alternatively, a country may be particularly attractive as a 
destination of FDI due to the quality of its institutions (such as the rule of law, regulatory 
burden, corruption), the quality of its labor force, its tax treatment of multinationals, or its 
factor prices, all variables that are important even under the assumption of zero trade 
costs. These factors should dominate market size in the case of vertical FDI, in which the 
foreign affiliates produce for the world market.  
 
Effects of RIA by a Source Country 
 
•  Diversion/Dilution Effect: FDI toward host countries can also be affected by RIA 
activity by a source country, whether or not the host is a partner of the source. If 
common membership in a regional integration agreement with the source country 
makes a host country relatively more attractive as a location for FDI (as it does in the 
vertical model), then such RIA will make non-members relatively less attractive. We 
call this effect FDI diversion, in analogy to Viner’s (1950) classic trade diversion 
                                                        
13 In addition, large countries may be relatively more attractive as the size of the domestic market works as 
an insurance against the possibility of a dismantling of the RIA. 
14 As an example, the auto industry in Uruguay was practically undeveloped, even during the years of 
import substitution industrialization.    11




Similar effects would be experienced by a member when the source country enlarges 
its RIA. Take, for instance, the potential effects on FDI flows from the US to Mexico 
once the FTAA is established. To the extent that the investment is there to exploit 
some locational advantages of Mexico, as the preferential access of Mexico to the US 
becomes  diluted by the FTAA, part of the FDI may be relocated to other new 
members which may now offer an even better package. This is what we call FDI 







While there has been some empirical work on the link between integration and FDI, it has 
been mostly based on case studies, focusing on the European Union, on Mexico 
following NAFTA, or on Mercosur. As far as we know, there has been no systematic 
empirical evaluation of the effects of regional integration of FDI for a large sample of 
countries. The purpose of this section is to contribute to fill this void in the literature. 
 
For this purpose, we use data on bilateral outward FDI stocks from the OECD 
International Direct Investment Statistics. The dataset covers FDI from 20 source 
countries, all of them from the OECD, to 60 host countries, from 1982 through 1998. One 
shortcoming of this data is that it does not cover FDI between developing countries. Yet, 
                                                        
15 As in Viner’s trade diversion (see box on the subject in chapter 1), the formation of a RIA may divert 
FDI from the most efficient location to a partner. For example, a US firm may locate in Mexico, following 
NAFTA, an the production of an intermediate input it may have otherwise located in Costa Rica, in the 
absence of the preferential access enjoyed by Mexico. In Mexico, this “trade diversion” effect will be 
combined with all other effects of common membership with the source country. What we call trade 
diversion in this paper is the loss suffered by Costa Rica, as well as other countries, as a result of the 
creation of NAFTA.    12
it is the most complete source available for bilateral FDI, which is a key ingredient to 
study the effects of integration on foreign investment. 
 
Our empirical strategy is based on the gravity model, a standard specification in the 
empirical literature on the determinants of bilateral trade, which has also been recently 
used in the analysis of FDI location.
17  In its simplest formulation, it states that bilateral 
trade flows (in our case bilateral FDI stocks) depend positively on the product of the 
GDPs of both economies and negatively on the distance between them. Typical variables 
added to the simplest gravity specification in the trade literature include GDP per capita, 
as well as dummies indicating whether the two countries share a common border, a 
common language, past colonial links, etc.  
 
In this paper, in line with our specific focus on the dynamic effect of the creation of 
RIAs, we will use a modified version of the standard gravity model that abstracts from 
most country and pair-specific aspects usually addressed in previous work. Thus time-
invariant pair-specific variables such as distance, borders, common language, or colonial 
links will be subsumed in country pair fixed effects, in order to isolate the dynamic 
effects, and leave out the cross-sectional variation. We believe this is the cleanest 
possible way to address the impact of regional integration agreements on FDI.
18 In 
addition, we include source and host nominal GDP to control for size, and time fixed 
effects to control for the spectacular increase in FDI over time. Finally, we augment the 
traditional gravity equation with a number of variables associated with the effects of 
regional integration discussed above. 
 
The first of regional integration variable in our baseline specification is Same FTA, a 
dummy that takes a value of 1 when the source and the host countries belong to the same 
Free Trade Area. In order to construct this variable, we used the description of existing 
                                                                                                                                                                     
16 Another example of investment diversion is found in the European Union: see Baldwin, Forslid, and 
Haaland (1999). 
17 See Eaton and Tamura (1994), Frankel and Wei (1997), Wei (1997, 2000), Blonigen and Davis (2000), 
Stein and Daude (2001a and 2001b) and Levy Yeyati, Panizza and Stein (2001).   13
regional trade agreements included in Frankel et al. (1997) (see Table 1A in Appendix).
19 
This variable captures a combination of channels: tariff-jumping, international vertical 
integration, and the potential effect of investment provisions on FDI.
20 
 
A second integration variable we use is  Extended Market Host, which captures the 
extended market effect discussed in the previous section. This variable is constructed as 
the log of the joint GDP of all the countries to which the host has tariff-free access due to 
common membership in a FTA (we include the host’s own GDP as well). Following the 
previous discussion, we expect the coefficient of Extended Market Host to be positive, 
regardless of the motive for FDI. As an alternative to this variable, we also used a dummy 
that takes a value of 1 when the host country has FTA partners other than the source 
country.  
 
A third integration variable is Extended Market Source. Similarly to Extended Market 
Host, it is measured as the log of the joint GDP of the source country plus all the 
countries that are FTA partners of the source country. This variable captures the FDI 
diversion/dilution effects, and we expect its coefficient to have a negative sign, 
suggesting that FDI to a host country diminishes when firms in the source country have 
other FTA partners in which to locate their investments. 
21  
 
Hence, our basic specification is as follows: 
 
Log (1+FDIijt)  =  a + b1 lGDP hostijt + b2 lGDP sourceijt + g sameftaijt + 
 
          + d1 EM hostijt + d2 EM sourceijt + fDij + jYt + eijt    (1) 
                                                                                                                                                                     
18 To a certain extent, the inclusion of the country pair dummies addresses potential endogeneity problems, 
which would arise if countries select their RIA partners on the basis of the multinational activity between 
them. 
19 We did not include as FTAs country pairs that have preferential trade agreements, in which trade barriers 
among members are reduced but not eliminated. Countries that are part of a customs union are coded as 
members of the same FTA. 
20 It would have been nice to include an index of depth of investment provisions within different FTAs in 
order to separate the effect of investment provisions on FDI. To our knowledge, however, such a measure 
does not exist. Since all our RIAs involving countries in the North contain some investment provisions, a 
simple dummy variable would not be helpful in identifying these effects.  
21 Similar results are obtained with a dummy that takes a value of 1 when the source country has FTA 
partners other than the host. A dummy like this one was used by Frankel et al. (1997) to study trade 
diversion.   14
 
 
where FDIij is the stock of foreign investment of country i in country j, lGDP is the log of 
GDP, EM host  and EM source  stand for Extended Market of the host and source 
countries, Dij is country pair fixed effect, Yt is the time fixed effect, and ?ij is the error 
term. 
 
A few methodological points are in order. We use a double log specification, which is 
standard, and has typically shown the best adjustment to the data in the empirical trade 
literature using the gravity model. There is, however, a problem in taking logs of our 
dependent variable. Our dataset includes a large number of observations where FDI 
stocks are zero (more than 60 percent of the sample), which would be dropped by taking 
logs. The problem of the zero variables is typical in gravity equations, and it has been 
dealt with in different ways. 
 
Some authors (see for example Rose, 2000), simply exclude the observations in which 
the dependent variable takes a value of zero, for which the log does not exist. A problem 
with this approach is that those observations do convey important information for the 
problem at hand (it could be that zero observations tend to occur between countries that 
do not belong to the same FTA, for example). Given the importance of zero observations 
in our sample, this strategy could lead to a serious estimation bias. 
 
Eichengreen and Irwin (1995, 1997) have proposed a simple transformation to deal with 
the zeros problem: work with log (1 + trade), instead of the log of trade. This has the 
advantage of simplicity, and the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities, when the 
values of trade tend to be large, since in this case log (1 + trade) is approximately equal to 
log (trade). In turn, they scale up the coefficients obtained from the OLS by a factor equal 
to the ratio between the total number of observations and the number of non-zero 
observations.
22 A disadvantage of this approach is that it is somewhat ad hoc.
23 Another 
                                                        
22 This procedure has been shown to approximate quite well a Tobit regression (Greene, 1980). 
23 Notice that any transformation of the type LFDI = log (x + FDI) with x > 0 would do the trick. But x = 1 
is a natural choice because it yields a fixed point at zero, i.e., log (1+x) = x at x = 0. A different version of   15
approach has been to use Tobit instead of OLS, which can be justified either by assuming 
that zero values are due to the presence of fixed costs of investing abroad, or that stocks 
below a certain threshold value are incorrectly recorded as zeros. While in principle this 
approach is less ad hoc, its results can no longer be interpreted in terms of elasticities and 
estimation of the magnitude of the effect becomes less straightforward. One practical way 
to proceed in this case is to assess the sensitivity of the main results to alternative 
methodologies. Thus, while we chose as our benchmark a country-pair fixed effect model 
using the transformation proposed by Eichengreen and Irwin, for the sake of comparison 
we present below some results using alternative estimation procedures. 
 
To the basic specification described in (1), we add controls for non-RIA related pair and 
host-specific factors that affect the impact of RIAs on FDI. Among the fist group, we 
include source-host difference in capital per worker, to proxy for relative factor 
endowment, and distance and bilateral trade, to control for the potential 
complementarities of FDI and trade.
24 Given the presumably positive effect of an RIA on 
bilateral trade, a natural question arises as to what extent the trade effect underlies the 
impact on FDI, whatever its sign. On the other hand, FDI-trade complementarity provides 
an additional robustness check to our results, as it would be consistent with a positive 
RIA-FDI link. Among the second group, we include the inflation rate, to proxy for the 
investment environment, an index of cumulative privatization, which may have induced 
large and concentrated capital inflows, and trade openness.  
 
In addition, we add different measures of a host attractiveness that captures individual 
countries’ propensity to attract FDI, which we use to test for redistributive effects within 
an RIA. This propensity is computed from our baseline regression replacing pair 
dummies by host and source dummies, and bilateral controls standard in extended gravity 
models (distance, common language, border, and common colonial background). The 
coefficients of each of the host dummies provide a measure of time-invariant country-
                                                                                                                                                                     
this approach, used by Eaton and Tamura (1994) and Wei (2000), uses as dependent variable the log of (a + 
FDI), and estimates the value of a.    16
specific factors influencing FDI inflows. These coefficients, recovered from the OLS 
regression, are then used as our measure of absolute attractiveness. A measure of relative 





Before presenting the main empirical results regarding the effects of RIA on bilateral FDI 
stocks, we discuss briefly the effects of the presence of zero values of FDI in the sample 
and compare the estimated impact of RIAs (in particular our same FTA variable) using 
different methodologies. Next, we investigate the possible existence of FDI diversion and 
the extended market effect. Finally, we focus on other factors, such as differences in 
factor proportions, trade openness and FDI attractiveness, which may affect the impact of 
our integration variables on the bilateral stocks of FDI.  
 
Nearly two-thirds of our observations have a zero value for the bilateral stock of FDI. 
Using our baseline specification, the regressions in Table 1 illustrate how different 
methodologies for dealing with this problem affect the results. In the first column of 
Table 1, we estimate equation (1) using as dependent variable the log of FDI. As a result, 
all zeros are discarded, reducing the sample to 6,768 observations. The estimated effect 
of a common FTA membership on the bilateral FDI stock is positive and significant. 
Column 2 reports a similar regression, this time using as dependent variable the 
transformation suggested the log of (1 + FDI). To make the results comparable with those 
of the first column, w e restrict the sample to include only observations with strictly 
positive values for our dependent variable. The results are quite similar to those of the 
first regression. The point estimate for same FTA falls to 0.18 from 0.20. Hence, the 
transformation does not affect the results in any noticeable way. 
  
Next, we rerun the same equation for the whole sample. As can be seen, the inclusion of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
24 Complementarities between FDI and trade have been found in the literature for the case of vertically 
integrated multinationals for which FDI is associated with larger trade flows of intermediate goods 
(Brainard and Riker, 1997, Head and Ries, 2001, and Blonigen 2001).   17
zero observations drives up the same FTA coefficient to 0.77, confirming our concern 
that ignoring these observations might bias the results considerably. Indeed, the exclusion 
of zero observations introduces an important downward bias in the estimation of the 
effect of our variable of interest: Since the overall effect of a FTA is positive, it is only 
natural that individual pairs are more likely to have had zero FDI during periods in which 
they did not share common membership in a FTA. Moreover, the inclusion of zeros 
inverts the sign of the effect of expansions in the source market, which are now 
negatively and significantly correlated with FDI, in line with our priors about the 
diverting effects of the source country’s joining a RIA to which the host does not belong. 
As expected, the FTA effect changes significantly when we replace pair dummies by a 
set of source and host fixed effects and bilateral controls standard in gravity models for 
trade (column 4). Pair effects capture the correlation between RIAs and bilateral FDI for 
those pairs that share a FTA throughout the period, so that in column 3 the same FTA 
dummy only reflects the impact of joining a FTA. In contrast, in column 4, the same FTA 
dummy also captures the difference between those country pairs that share a FTA and 
those that do not. As it turns out, the impact of the same FTA variable is noticeably 
stronger when we isolate the dynamic effect of joining a FTA, as we do in column 3. 
Rerunning the regression with host and source country effects using a Tobit model 
(column 5) produces estimates of the FTA effect which are comparable to (albeit smaller 
than) those obtained in column 4. In the rest of the paper, we rely on the model of 
regression 3 as our baseline specification.
25 
 
Table 2 reports the basic tests of the hypothesis outlined in the previous section, 
reproducing in column 1 the results of our baseline regression for ease of comparison. 
They indicate that joining a FTA, on average, more than doubles the bilateral FDI 
between its members.
 26 The positive effect suggests that any potential loss of FDI due to 
the tariff-jumping argument is more than offset by other effects that operate in the 
                                                        
25 One note of caution is related to the fact that, if we scale up the coefficients in regressions 3 and 4 by a 
factor of 18,308/6,768, as suggested by Greene (1980), we obtain a same FTA coefficient of nearly 2, 
which appears to be unrealistically large and, from a simple comparison between OLS and Tobit estimates 
of the same specification, unwarranted. While the paper’s main focus is on the qualitative results, the reader 
has to bear in mind that the quantitative effects mentioned for illustrative purposes should be taken as lower 
bound estimates. 
26 The implied effect of common FTA membership is calculated as exp (0.77) – 1 = 1.16, or 116%.   18
opposite direction. 
 
This result is consistent with the signs we obtain for the extended market effect: A larger 
extended market of the source country diverts investment toward the members of that 
extended market.
 27 More precisely, the doubling of the extended market of the source 
leads to a decline of nearly 27 percent in the average FDI stock originating in this 
country. Conversely, the size of the extended market of the host country has a positive 
effect on the bilateral FDI stock attracted from the source. In turn, a 100 percent increase 




While the size of the estimated effects for the host extended market may seem small, it 
should be considered that changes in the extended market tend to be large rather than 
marginal. For example, when Mexico entered NAFTA its extended market increased by a 
factor of 18!  This change would be associated with an increase in FDI from outside 
countries of nearly 100 percent.
29 
 
In Table 2 we explore some additional factors that may be important in explaining the 
expected effect of FTAs on FDI. We first add a measure of the cumulative value of 
privatized assets. As expected, privatizations are correlated with the stock of FDI, 
although their inclusion does not alter the results for our variables of interest. The same 
can be said of the inflation rate, which itself fails to be significant, in a result possibly due 
to the long-run nature of the investment plans underpinning the evolution of FDI.  
 
Table 3 explores host and pair specific characteristics that may influence the intensity of 
the FTA effect, as well as shed some light on its nature (the baseline results are 
                                                        
27 The reader should bear in mind that the average market size of host and source are already captured by 
the pair dummies, while the increase over time in FDI is captured by the time effects 
28 Alternatively, we tested a dummy that equals one if the source country is a member of an FTA to which 
the host country does not belong. As expected, we find that FDI from this source to non-FTA members 
declines, again indicating the existence of FDI diversion. Similarly, a dummy that equals one if the host 
country is a member of an FTA that does not include the source is associated with an increase in bilateral 
FDI: larger home markets increases the country’s attractiveness as a location for FDI. 
29 1700%*0.060 = 102%   19
reproduced for ease of comparison). In column 2 we introduce the openness of the host 
country, measured as the ratio of trade to GDP. If FDI tends to be of the vertical or 
“preference for variety” types, rather than the horizontal type, the impact of an FTA on 
FDI should be larger when the economy is more open, since in closed economies FDI 
tends to be of the horizontal, tariff-jumping type. The results appear to confirm these 
views. While the estimated effect of the same FTA is nearly the same as in the baseline 
estimation, the interaction with the same FTA dummy is positive and significant: More 
open economies attract proportionally more FDI when they join an FTA, contradicting 
the tariff-jumping hypothesis, and lending support to the vertical / preference for variety 
story.  
 
While the previous result is in line with the evidence supporting FDI-trade 
complementarity, controlling for bilateral trade points in the same direction. Not only 
does FDI increase with bilateral trade but also the positive effect of an agreement on FDI 
is a positive function of the intensity of trade links.  As shown in column 3, trade appears 
to be positively correlated with FDI, confirming our interpretation of the previous 
findings, and to increase the gains in terms of FDI associated with a RIA. The results are 
once again confirmed when we use bilateral distance as a proxy for trade in the 
interaction term, to reduce potential endogeneity problems (column 4).
30 
 
Next, we interact the same FTA dummy with the source-host difference in capital per 
worker  as a proxy for relative factor endowments. Our priors here are not 
straightforward. According to the standard models of vertical and horizontal FDI, one 
should expect that the more diverse the level of relative factor endowments of a pair of 
countries, the more vertical the nature of FDI between the two should be. As vertical FDI 
increases—but horizontal FDI falls— with integration, standard theory would predict the 
positive effects of FDI to be larger for more dissimilar countries pairs (in which case the 
coefficient for the interaction term should be positive). However, as we argued at the 
beginning of the paper, FDI between developed countries is not purely horizontal. It also 
involves the production of different varieties in different countries, a form of FDI that is 
                                                        
30 Bilateral distance alone is not included in the regression due to the presence of pair effects.   20
complementary with trade. Furthermore, in the case of North-South country pairs, FDI is 
not purely vertical. It more likely involves a mixture of horizontal FDI toward countries 
with high protection, and vertical FDI toward countries with low protection. This 
discussion suggests that the predicted sign of the interaction term is not as clear, and is in 
the end an empirical question. Column 5 shows that the coefficient for the interaction 
term is negative, suggesting that FTAs increase FDI among (similarly endowed) 
developed countries, but this increase becomes smaller as the disparity between the 
source and the host country increases, suggesting that North-South pairings may require a 
minimum degree of development (rather than a large supply of cheap unskilled labor) for 
the South host to profit from the partnership.
31  
 
Attractiveness: FDI as a beauty contest 
 
The previous discussion highlighted the fact that while, on average, we should expect to 
see an increase in FDI as a consequence of a FTA, the impact might differ critically 
across the member countries. An alternative and relatively simple way to illustrate the 
possibility of winners and losers is to distinguish countries by their propensity to attract 
FDI. Intuitively, the most attractive countries within a FTA will receive the bulk of the 
increase in FDI. Moreover, given that a FTA allows firms to supply the extended market 
from a single location, FDI relocation may result in a net decline in FDI stocks in less 
FDI-friendly economies.  
 
As mentioned in our previous discussion, redistributive effects within a regional bloc 
may depend on the characteristics that affect the relative attractiveness to foreign 
investors of the member countries. To measure a country’s propensity to attract FDI, we 
estimate our baseline regression replacing pair dummies by source and host fixed effects 
plus a number of standard bilateral controls (Table 4). In this way, individual host effects 
should capture all those time-invariant factors (relative distance to sources, institutions, 
                                                        
31 Other relative factor endowment proxies tested (relative land per worker, relative skilled labor) yielded 
similar results.   21
infrastructure, etc.) that make the country more attractive to FDI, or its  absolute 
attractiveness.  
 
Next, we re-estimated the baseline equation interacting the same FTA dummy with our 
measure of absolute attractiveness. As expected,  the estimated effect is positive and 
significant (Table 4, column 2). Thus, countries that are more attractive to foreign 
investors may benefit more from entering an FTA than others. Indeed, there may be 
winners and losers in the integration process: Countries with very low attractiveness are 
more likely to experience a net decline in FDI stocks.
32   Interestingly, absolute 
attractiveness does not affect the impact of a market expansion, beyond what is captured 
by the same FTA interaction (column 3). 
 
One could argue that being attractive is a relative concept: if an RIA increases the market 
readily accessible to their members, the key factor at the time of choosing a location 
should be the relative attractiveness within the region, or how a particular RIA member 
compares with the rest. Since there is no obvious way to measure this relative 
attractiveness, we test several alternative proxies. First, we construct a dummy that is one 
whenever a country displays the highest attractiveness index within a RIA.
33 In addition, 
for the particular case of the effect of the extended market, relative size may be crucial.
34 
To address this point we include an additional dummy that takes a value of one if the 
country is the largest in its RIA.
35 Both the relative attractiveness and size interactions 
with the extended market at the host proved to be significant and positive, adding to the 
direct impact of a FTAs.  
 
In sum, RIA and, in particular, the associated market enlargement hava a stronger 
positive effect on FDI in an FDI-friendly environment. More importantly, unattractive 
                                                        
32 Note that a negative net effect is always possible whenever the negative impact of the increase in the 
source extended market dominates the combined positive impact through the FTA and host extended 
market effects. 
33 If the country belongs to two RIAs, it suffices to be the most attractive in one of them. Extensive 
robustness tests yielded comparable results using variations of these measures that included dropping no 
RIA countries, assigning a 1 to those that do not belong to an RIA and assigning a one only if the country is 
the most attractive in all of the RIA to which it belongs. 
34 See footnote 13 for an additional argument.   22
countries may lose FDI as a result of joining a RIA, due to stiffer competition from their 





In this paper we have shown that Regional Integration Agreements can have a very 
important effect on foreign direct investment. On average, common membership in an 
FTA with a source country nearly doubles the bilateral stocks of FDI. The increase in the 
size of the market associated with the formation of RIAs also implies important gains for 
the member countries. Our results show that FDI and trade are largely complementary. 
They also suggest that, for example, a move towards the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
would in principle bolster FDI flows to Latin America considerably. 
 
However, the study study also indicates that FDI gains due to Regional Integration 
Agreements are unlikely to be distributed evenly. What determines whether a country 
wins or loses? Our results suggest that benefits will be smaller for countries that are 
closed to international trade, relatively less similar in their factor endowments 
(alternatively, in their production mix or their degree of development) and altogether 
unattractive to foreign investors. While not much can be done to change the country’s 
relative endowments in the short run, the other two factors are certainly amenable to 
policy action. 
 
Openness is important, since the formation of RIAs increases the incentives for 
multinational activity of the vertical variety (which takes advantage of differences in 
factor proportions), but reduces multinational activity of the horizontal variety, which is a 
substitute for trade. Not only will openness increase the impact of the RIA on FDI, but it  
can also more generally change the composition of FDI from horizontal to vertical. Since 
horizontal FDI sometimes occurs due to the existence of a distortion (high protection), 
and vertical FDI responds to comparative advantage, it could be argued that, regardless of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
35 Robustness checks as those described in footnote 31 did not change the results.    23




It seems obvious that becoming more attractive to foreign investors (and improving the 
investment environment in general) can only be a positive development. What exactly 
can a country do to make itself more attractive to foreign investors is already the subject 
of some academic reaserch. The findings in this paper should make it a more urgent 
topic, as many of the benefits on which RIAs can easily turn up to be losses for countries 





                                                        
36 Clearly, this is not the case for non-tradable goods where FDI can only occur in the horizontal form.   24
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Table 1 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
   OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  TOBIT 
  Ln(FDI)  Ln(FDI + 1)  Ln(FDI+1)  Ln(FDI+1)  Ln(FDI+1) 
       if FDI >0  All  All  All 
GDP Host  0.6759  0.6636  0.8622  0.8499  -0.3208 
  (11.360)**  (12.257)**  (14.676)**  (11.509)**  -1.617 
           
GDP Source  0.9925  0.9199  -0.1362  -0.0905  0.6634 
  (13.426)**  (13.676)**  (1.314)  (0.706)  (2.324)* 
           
Extended Market Host  0.0688  0.0585  0.0601  0.0802  0.2281 
  (4.121)**  (3.851)**  (2.668)**  (2.861)**  (3.765)** 
           
Extended Market Source  0.0615  0.0239  -0.268  -0.2338  -0.1512 
  (3.388)**  (1.445)  (11.756)**  (8.326)**  (2.314)* 
           
Same FTA  0.2002  0.1775  0.7702  0.3204  0.2377 
  (3.860)**  (3.761)**  (9.507)**  (4.898)**  (1.786)* 
           
Distance        -0.7481  -1.7665 
        (23.809)**  (27.239)** 
           
Border        0.0552  -0.9969 
        (0.550)  (5.248)** 
           
Common Language        0.1389  1.4438 
        (0.853)  (4.485)** 
           
Colonial        0.6247  1.0356 
        (8.519)**  (7.046)** 
           
Constant  -42.3202  -38.6888  -9.218  -6.387  11.3974 
  (17.196)**  (17.277)**  (2.900)**  (1.563)  (1.166) 
           
Observations  6768  6768  18308  17957  17957 
Number of pair  785  785  1140  -  - 
Adjusted R-squared  0.4609  0.4595  0.1212  0.584  0.2699 
test F Pair Effects  65.05**  69.69**  18.89**    - 
test F Host and Source Effects        80.00**  52.89** 
test F Time Effects  31.86**  32.76**  41.32**  26.38**  34.58** 
Absolute values of t – statistics in parenthesis.  
** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%. 
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Table 2 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
GDP Host  0.8622  0.8796  0.8956  0.8969 
  (14.676)**  (14.917)**  (12.931)**  (12.948)** 
         
GDP Source  -0.1362  -0.1344  -0.2036  -0.2031 
  (1.314)  (1.297)  (1.848)  (1.844) 
         
Extended Market Host  0.0601  0.0502  0.0455  0.0428 
  (2.668)**  (2.213)*  (1.900)  (1.774) 
         
Extended Market Source  -0.268  -0.2705  -0.2642  -0.265 
  (11.756)**  (11.860)**  (10.879)**  (10.906)** 
         
Same FTA  0.7702  0.818  0.7695  0.7839 
  (9.507)**  (9.945)**  (9.278)**  (9.305)** 
         
Accumulated Priv +1    0.0208    0.0064 
    (3.324)**    (0.977) 
         
Inflation      0.0259  0.0245 
      (1.546)  (1.460) 
         
Constant  -9.218  -9.4488  -8.0073  -7.9763 
  (2.900)**  (2.973)**  (2.312)*  (2.303)* 
         
Observations  18308  18308  16739  16739 
Number of pair  1140  1140  1100  1100 
Adjusted R2  0.1212  0.121  0.0939  0.0937 
test F Pair Effects  18.89**  18.91**  17.95**  17.92** 
test F Time Effects  41.32**  36.45**  36.52**  33.94** 
Absolute values of t – statistics in parenthesis.  
** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%. 
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Table 3 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
GDP Host  0.8622  0.8547  0.8665  0.8479  0.7667 
  (14.676)**  (14.540)**  (12.409)**  (14.159)**  (8.744)** 
           
GDP Source  -0.1362  -0.1379  -0.1682  -0.1794  -0.3632 
  (1.314)  (1.331)  -1.53  (1.707)  (2.727)** 
           
Extended Market Host  0.0601  0.0658  0.0447  0.0648  -0.0205 
  (2.668)**  (2.913)**  -1.783  (2.832)**  (0.681) 
           
Extended Market Source  -0.268  -0.2694  -0.2964  -0.2662  -0.2739 
  (11.756)**  (11.817)**  (12.426)**  (11.519)**  (9.211)** 
           
Same FTA  0.7702  0.1239  -2.0445  3.1689  1.1522 
  (9.507)**  (0.563)  (7.150)**  (3.017)**  (9.021)** 
           
Same FTA * Average Openness    0.0096       
    (3.161)**       
           
Trade      0.1194     
      (3.639)**     
           
Same FTA * Trade      0.4257     
      (10.535)**    
           
Same FTA * Distance        -0.3472   
        (2.285)*   
           
Same FTA * Average Difference in capital per worker        -0.78 
          (4.186)** 
           
Constant  -9.218  -9.0972  -7.8777  -7.8766  1.8284 
  (2.900)**  (2.863)**  (2.265)*  (2.441)*  (0.428) 
           
Effect of Same FTA (MIN)    0.319  -1.545  1.460  1.152 
Effect of Same FTA (MEAN)    0.795  1.004  0.870  0.829 
Effect of Same FTA (MAX)    1.447  3.072  0.442  -0.325 
           
Observations  18308  18308  16341  17957  12343 
Number of pair  1140  1140  1105  1104  740 
Adjusted R2  0.1212  0.1221  0.1827  0.1027  0.0389 
test F Pair Effects  18.89**  18.84**  16.23**  18.72**  18.04** 
test F Time Effects  41.32**  18.04**  35.34**  40.97**  41.33** 
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Table 4 
   Dependent variable : Stock of FDI 
Independent Variables  GDP Host   GDP Source   Ext Market Host  Ext Market Source Same FTA  
Coefficient  0.84979  -0.095  0.0803  -0.2334  0.3189 
t statistic  (11.51**)  (-0.74)  (8.34)**  (2.86)**  (4.88)** 
           
Independent Variable  Distance   Border   Colonial Links   Common Lang.   
Coefficient  -0.7468  0.0602  0.1463  0.6195   
t statistic  (23.78)**  (0.6)  (0.9)  (8.49)**   
           
   Host Effects   Source Country Effects   Year Effects 
Test F   43.12**      195.75**     108.94** 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Ln(GDP Host)  0.8622  0.8552  0.8649  0.8421  0.8022 
  (14.676)** (14.543)**  (14.536)**  (14.316)**  (13.648)** 
           
Ln(GDP Source)  -0.1362  -0.1314  -0.1311  -0.1335  -0.1328 
  (1.314)  (1.268)  (1.265)  (1.289)  (1.286) 
           
Extended Market Host  0.0601  0.0627  0.006  0.0266  0.0208 
  (2.668)**  (2.784)**  (0.104)  (1.125)  (0.883) 
           
Extended Market Source  -0.268  -0.2694  -0.2687  -0.2714  -0.2747 
  (11.756)** (11.814)**  (11.779)**  (11.909)**  (12.089)** 
           
Same FTA  0.7702  2.0609  2.1351  1.9369  2.0558 
  (9.507)**  (4.090)**  (4.197)**  (3.842)**  (4.089)** 
           
Same FTA * Attractivennes    0.3411  0.3647  0.2954  0.3125 
    (2.595)**  (2.736)**  (2.243)*  (2.380)* 
           
Extended Market Host * Attractivenness     -0.0167     
      (1.068)     
           
Extended Market Host * Most Attractive       0.1749  0.2037 
        (5.023)**  (5.848)** 
           
Extended Market Host * Biggest          0.618 
          (10.160)** 
           
Constant  -9.218  -9.201  -9.498  -8.6671  -10.1947 
  (2.900)**  (2.896)**  (2.978)**  (2.728)**  (3.215)** 
           
Effect of Same FTA (MIN)    0.446  0.408  0.538  0.576 
Effect of Same FTA (MEAN)    0.791  0.777  0.837  0.892 
Effect of Same FTA (MAX)    1.407  1.436  1.370  1.457 
           
Observations  18308  18308  18308  18308  18308 
Number of pair  1140  1140  1140  1140  1140 
Adjusted R2  0.1212  0.1245  0.0976  0.069  0.0418 
test F Pair Effects  18.89**  18.73**  16.58**  18.51**  18.62** 
test F Time Effects  41.32**  41.37**  41.43**  41.29**  38.8** 
Absolute values of t – statistics in parenthesis.  ** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%.   32
Table A.1 Free Trade Agreements  
FTA  Creation   Members 
European Union 
(EU) 
1957  Austria (since 1995), Belgium, Denmark (since 
1973), Finland (since 1995), France, Germany, 
Greece (since 1981), Ireland (since 1973), Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal (since 1986), 
Spain(since 1986), Sweden (since 1995), United 




1960  Austria (until 1994), Denmark (until 1972), 
Finland (1986-1994), Iceland (since 1970), 
Liechtenstein (since 1991), Norway, Portugal (until 
1985),  Sweden (until 1994), Switzerland, United 




1994  All members of the European Union, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway 
Central European 
Free Trade Area 
(CEFTA) 
1992  Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak 


















1959  Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua 
Group of Three   1994  Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela 
Bolivia-Mexico 
FTA 





1992  Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 





1983  Australia, New Zealand 
South African 
Custom Union 
1910  Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia (since 1 990), South 
Africa, Swaziland   33
Table A.2. Data Sources 
 
Variable  Source 
Privatizations  Chong, Alberto and Florencio López-de-Silanes (2002) 
“Privatization and Labor Force Restructuring Around the 
World.” Manuscript Yale University (forthcoming NBER) 
Inflation  International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics 
FDI Stock  OECD. 2000.  International Direct Investment Statistics 
Yearbook. Paris, France: Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. 
Factor Endowments  Spilimbergo, Antonio, Juan Luis Londono, and Miguel Szekely 
(1999) “Income Distribution, Factor Endowments, and Trade 
Openness.” Journal of Development Economics v59, n1 (June 
1999): 77-101 
Distance, Border, Common 
Language and Colonial Links  
The Worldeconomic Factbook, CIA website 
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html   
GDP  World Development Indicators 
 
 Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Business School Working Papers 
 
Working Papers  2003 
Nº16  "Business Cycle and Macroeconomic Policy Coordination in MERCOSUR" 
Martín Gonzalez Rozada (UTDT) y José Fanelli (CEDES). 
Nº15  "The Fiscal Spending Gap and the Procyclicality of Public Expenditure" 
Eduardo Levy Yeyati (UTDT) y Sebastián Galiani (UDESA). 
Nº14  "Financial Dollarization and Debt Deflation under a Currency Board" 
Eduardo Levy Yeyati (UTDT), Ernesto Schargrodsky (UTDT) y Sebastián Galiani (UDESA). 
 Nº13 "¿ Po  qué crecen menos los regímenes de tipo de cambio fijo? El efecto de los Sudden 
Stops", Federico Stuzenegger (UTDT). 
 Nº12  Concentration and Foreign Penetration in Latin American Banking Sec ors: Impact on 
Competition and Risk", Eduardo Levy Yeyati (UTDT) y Alejandro Micco (IADB). 
 Nº11  Default`s in the 1990`s: What have we learned?", 








Nº10 "Un año de medición del Indice de Demanda Laboral: situación actual y perspectivas , 
Victoria Lamdany (UTDT) y Luciana Monteverde (UTDT) 
Nº09 "Liquidity Protection versus Moral Hazard: The Role of the IMF", 
Andrew Powell (UTDT) y Leandro Arozamena (UTDT) 
 Nº08 "Financial Dedollarization: A Carrot and Stick Approach", Eduardo Levy Yeyati (UTDT) 
 Nº07 "The Price of Inconvertible Deposits: The Stock Market Boom during the Argentine crisis", 
Eduardo Levy Yeyati (UTDT), Sergio Schmukler (WB) y Neeltje van Horen (WB) 
Nº06  "Aftermaths of Current Account Crisis: Export Growth or Import Contraction?", 
Federico Sturzenegger (UTDT), Pablo Guidotti (UTDT) y Agustín Villar (BIS) 
 Nº05  Regional Integration and the Location of FDI", 
Eduardo Levy Yeyati (UTDT), Christian Daude (UM ) y Ernesto Stein (BID) 
 Nº04 "A new test for the success of inflation targeting", 
Andrew Powell (UTDT), Martin Gonzalez Rozada (UTDT) y Verónica Cohen Sabbán (BCRA) 
 Nº03 "Living and Dying with Ha d Pegs: The Rise and Fall of Argentina´s Currency Board", 
Eduardo Levy Yeyati (UTDT), Augusto de la Torre (WB) y Sergio Schmukler (WB) 
 Nº02 "The Cyclical Nature of FDI flows , 
Eduardo Levy Yeyati (UTDT), Ugo Panizza (BID) y Ernesto Stein (BID)  Nº01 "Endogenous Deposit Dollarization", 
Eduardo Levy Yeyati (UTDT) y Christian Broda (FRBNY) 
 
Working Papers 2002 
Nº15 "The FTAA and the Location of FDI", 
Eduardo Levy Yeyati (UTDT), Christian Daude (UM ) y Ernesto Stein ( BID) 
Nº14 "Macroeconomic Coordination and Moneta y Unions in a N-country World: Do all Roads 
Lead to Rome?" 
Federico Sturzenegger (UTDT) y Andrew Powell (UTDT) 
Nº13  Reforming Capital Requirements in Emerging Countries" 
Andrew Powell (UTDT), Verónica Balzarotti (BCRA) y Christian Castro (UPF) 
Nº12 "Toolkit for the Analysis of Debt Problems , Federico Sturzenegger (UTDT) 
Nº11 "On the Endogeneity of Exchange Rate Regimes", 
Eduardo Levy Yeyati (UTDT), Federico Sturzenegger (UTDT) e Iliana Reggio (UCLA) 
Nº10 "Defaults in the 90´s: Factbook and Preliminary Lessons", Federico Sturzenegger (UTDT) 
Nº09 "Countries with international payments´ difficulties: what can the IMF do?" 
Andrew Powell (UTDT) 
Nº08 "The Argentina Crisis: Bad Luck, Bad Management, Bad Politics, Bad Advice",  
Andrew Powell (UTDT) 
Nº07 "Capital Inflows and Capital Outflows: Measurement, Determinants, Consequences", 
Andrew Powell (UTDT), Dilip Ratha (WB) y Sanket Mohapatra (CU) 
Nº06 "Banking on Foreigners: The Behaviour of International Bank Lending to Latin America, 
1985-2000", 
Andrew Powell (UTDT), María Soledad Martinez Peria (WB) y Ivanna Vladkova ( IMF) 
Nº05 "Classifying Exchange Rate Regimes: Deeds vs. Words" 





r Nº04"The Effect of Product Market Competition on Capital Structu e: Empirical Evidence from the 
Newspaper Industry", Ernesto Schargrodsky (UTDT) 
Nº03 "Financial globalization: Unequal blessings", 
Augusto de la Torre (World Bank), Eduardo Levy Yeyati (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella) y Sergio 
L. Schmukler (World Bank) 
Nº02 "Inference and estimation in small sample dynamic panel data models", 
Sebastian Galiani (UdeSA) y Martin Gonzalez-Rozada (UTDT) 
Nº01 "Why have poverty and income inequality increased so much? Argentina 1991-2002", 
Martín González-Rozada, (UTDT) y Alicia Menendez, (Princeton University).   